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Summary
A common theme in theories of subjective awareness
poses a self-related ‘‘observer’’ function, or a homun-
culus, as a critical element without which awareness
can not emerge. Here, we examined this question us-
ing fMRI. In our study, we compared brain activity pat-
terns produced by a demanding sensory categoriza-
tion paradigm to those engaged during self-reflective
introspection, using similar sensory stimuli. Our re-
sults show a complete segregation between the two
patterns of activity. Furthermore, regions that showed
enhanced activity during introspection underwent
a robust inhibition during the demanding perceptual
task. The results support the notion that self-related
processes are not necessarily engaged during sen-
sory perception and can be actually suppressed.
Introduction
Life is an art, and like perfect art it should be self-
forgetting.
—Suzuki, 1964
To what extent are self-representations engaged dur-
ing sensory perception? Surprisingly, this fundamental
question is far from being experimentally resolved. The
notion that an ‘‘observer’’ function or a ‘‘homunculus’’
is a critical ingredient of sensory perception has been
a common theme in a number of models of subjective
perception. Given a more concrete neuroanatomical
interpretation, these theories propose that subjective
awareness involves a kind of interplay between sensory
cortex and self-related prefrontal cortex. Thus, in a re-
cent extension of the ‘‘global work space’’ metaphor of
consciousness, Baars et al. (2003) suggest that con-
scious perception may entail a dialog between specific
self-related prefrontal regions and sensory cortex. Sim-
ilarly, Crick and Koch suggested a view of representa-
tions in the front of the brain having a ‘‘homunculus’’
function, ‘‘observing’’ the sensory back of the brain
(Crick and Koch, 2003).
Quite paradoxically, during truly intense sensory per-
ceptual states—such as watching an absorbing movie,
or being involved in a highly demanding sensory
task—the strong subjective feeling is of ‘‘losing the
self,’’ i.e., of disengagement from self-related reflective
processes. It can be argued, and indeed has been pro-
posed (Crick and Koch, 2003), that the self-related
homunculus function is an automatic, subconscious
*Correspondence: rafi.malach@weizmann.ac.ilprocess and consequently can not be directly accessi-
ble to the perceiving individual. With the advent of func-
tional brain imaging, this question is now experimentally
tractable, since it is now possible to observe brain acti-
vations that may be associated with subconscious pro-
cesses as well (Hannula et al., 2005).
Reviewing the relevant literature of brain imaging, it is
clear that a lot of data exist with regards to sensory cor-
tex on the one hand, and self-related regions on the
other—but very little information is available concerning
their potential interplay or coactivation.
In the domain of sensory perception, the advance in
our understanding has been truly dramatic, leading to
quite a highly detailed understanding of the basic func-
tional anatomy of human sensory cortex. Reviewing this
data is of course beyond the scope of this introduction.
Suffice it to say that we have a fairly consistent picture of
the layout of the hierarchy of cortical areas leading from
early V1 to high-order occipitotemporal object areas
such as the lateral occipital complex (LOC; Malach
et al., 2002), and major specializations such as face-
selective cortex in the fusiform gyrus are all examples
of robust and consistent activation patterns produced by
sensory stimulation (for reviews, see Grill-Spector and
Malach, 2004; Tootell et al., 1996). Similarly, in auditory
cortex, sensory representations have been described
at an increasingly fine detail (Formisano et al., 2003).
With regards to the other element of this study, that of
self-related cortical areas, the situation is more com-
plex. While the existence of a psychological structure
of ‘‘self’’ has been a central and established concept in
psychoanalytic literature (James, 1890; Wolf, 1988), its
neuroanatomical correlates have only recently become
a focus of detailed research. Nevertheless, recent neu-
roimaging work actually provides a surprisingly consis-
tent set of converging activation patterns. A number of
studies have addressed the issue of self-representa-
tions. These studies highlighted consistent cortical re-
gions, such as medial prefrontal cortex (PFC), especially
its dorsal part extending somewhat to dorsolateral PFC,
the anterior and posterior part of the cingulate cortex,
and more laterally the inferior parietal cortex (IPC)
(Schmitz et al., 2004; Gusnard et al., 2001; Johnson et al.,
2002; Keenan et al., 2000; Kelley et al., 2002).
Some of these studies point to a clear hemispheric
specialization within the broad spectrum of self-related
functions, with the right hemisphere engaged during
self-image processing, such as watching self-face im-
ages compared to popular faces (Keenan et al., 2000;
Schmitz et al., 2004), while the left hemisphere is en-
gaged during internally cued responses (Gusnard et al.,
2001). Interestingly, at least part of this network appears
to be involved also in attributing mental state to others
(Schmitz et al., 2004), which can be effective in allowing
predictive power of behavioral responses—the so-
called ‘‘theory of mind’’ (Vogeley et al., 2001; Gallagher
and Frith, 2003). This potential link is intriguing, since it
may offer a role for self-representations in social cogni-
tion (Frith and Frith, 1999; Stuss and Anderson, 2004).
However, the issue of self-related activations, their
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330Figure 1. Experimental Design and Stimuli
Used in the Visual and Auditory Scans
(A) Block design used in both visual and audi-
tory scans. Red epochs represent the ‘‘intro-
spection’’ condition, and dark and light blue
represent the ‘‘rapid’’ and ‘‘slow’’ categoriza-
tion conditions, respectively.
(B) Number of stimuli in each of the three ex-
perimental conditions (vertical colored bar):
‘‘rapid’’ categorization epochs contained 12
stimuli in each block, while ‘‘slow’’ categori-
zation and introspection epochs contained
four stimuli. Prior to each block, a visual cue
instructed subjects what task to do (vertical
gray bar).
(C) Stimuli used in experiment. Note that the
same set of stimuli (pictures and audio clips)
was used in both tasks. During the introspec-
tion task, subjects inspected the stimuli and
self-introspected about the emotional re-
sponses elicited in them by the stimuli (high-
arousal versus neutral). During the categori-
zation task, subjects categorized stimuli into
categories: animal versus others in the visual
scan, trumpet versus other in the auditory
scan.overlap with other functions, and their hemispheric lat-
eralization is still under debate (Morin, 2002; Turk
et al., 2002, 2003). More generally, it is important to em-
phasize that the extent to which self-related processes
involve a single, unified neural entity or rather a cluster
of weakly associated functions remains to be eluci-
dated.
These results have actually been anticipated by a de-
tailed neuropsychological literature that has documented
various aspects of self-image, personality characteris-
tics, planning, and decision making to be disrupted by
prefrontal damage (Damasio et al., 1994; Kolb, 1990;
Luria, 1973; Turk et al., 2002).
To conclude, despite its seemingly ill-defined and
multidimensional nature, converging neurological and
psychological evidence indicates that self-related rep-
resentations are associated with a consistent and repro-
ducible set of brain structures.
Given this substantial body of neuroimaging data re-
lated to sensory perception on the one hand, and self-
related processes on the other, it is surprising that
very few studies have directly addressed the question
of the interplay between the two—i.e., to what extent
do self-related regions and sensory cortex coactivate
during sensory perception?
In a recent study, Gusnard and colleagues (Gusnard
et al., 2001) found an interesting preferential activation
in dorsomedial PFC during introspection versus an ex-
ternal processing task, suggesting a specialization of
this region for self-related emotional processing. How-
ever, introspection is a very high-level cognitive task
that may include, in addition to the emotional self-re-
lated aspects, also increased attentional, memory, and
cognitive demands, so it is not clear what the actual
source of the preferential activation in this study was.
Here, we addressed this problem directly by manipu-
lating both the self-awareness level and the processing
load during our experiments. To map self-related repre-
sentations, we chose self-introspection as the most rel-evant self-engaging task (James, 1890) and compared it
to activity patterns induced by sensorimotor categoriza-
tion tasks. Critically, to disentangle the possible role of
attentional effects, we studied this relationship under
two different levels of processing loads. Our results
show a clear segregation between regions engaged dur-
ing self-related introspective processes and cortical
regions involved in sensorimotor processing. Further-
more, self-related regions were inhibited during sensori-
motor processing. Thus, the common idiom ‘‘losing
yourself in the act’’ receives here a clear neurophysio-
logical underpinnings.
Results
The aim of this fMRI study was to directly compare, dur-
ing the same scan, self-related processes with highly
engaging sensory processes, all the while trying to
keep the sensory stimuli and motor responses as similar
as possible. To that end, we employed the experimental
design depicted in Figure 1. The experiment was con-
ducted in both the visual and auditory domains and con-
sisted of three conditions: (1) an easy categorization
condition (‘‘slow’’), in which subjects categorized visual
and auditory objects presented at a slow rate (one stim-
ulus/3 s.); (2) an introspective condition (‘‘introspec-
tion’’), having identical stimuli and motor responses ex-
cept that subjects were required to self-introspect about
their own emotional responses (aroused versus neutral)
toward these stimuli, as used in previous experiments
(Bradley and Lang, 1994; Rotshtein et al., 2001); and
(3) a difficult categorization task (‘‘rapid’’) similar to the
‘‘slow’’ condition but at triple the stimulation rate.
Thus, ‘‘slow’’ and ‘‘introspection’’ conditions were iden-
tical in terms of sensory stimuli and motor output but
differed in the cognitive task. On the other hand,
‘‘slow’’ and ‘‘rapid’’ conditions were similar in the cogni-
tive task but differed in the sensorimotor processing and
attentional loads. Behavioral measurements verified
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331Figure 2. Evaluating Subjective Self-Awareness
(A) Subjective ratings of the level of self-awareness during the three experimental conditions (n = 7). Note that the rapid categorization task suc-
cessfully eliminated subjects’ sense of self-awareness. Arbitrary unit scale: 1 = no or negligible sense of self-awareness, 2 = mild level of self-
awareness, 3 = strong sense of self-awareness. Error bars, SEM.
(B) Scatter plot showing correlation between subjective self-awareness and SFG activation (n = 7). Vertical axis shows the percent signal change
(PSC), while the subjective rating of self-awareness is plotted on the horizontal axis (scale, same as in [A]). Each data point represents one con-
dition in one subject. Note the significant positive correlation between the reported level of self-awareness and fMRI activity in the left SFG.that indeed a high level of self-awareness was experi-
enced during the introspection task, while the rapid
categorization virtually abolished any subjective self-
awareness experience (Figure 2A; for details about sub-
jective rating, see Experimental Procedures). Averaged
data for the nine subjects in the visual scan showed per-
formances of 95% and 98% for rapid and slow categori-
zation, respectively, and 554 ms (SE, 610 ms) and 730
ms (SE, 625 ms), respectively, for reaction times.
Visual Domain: Mapping Introspection-Related
Activity
In order to map introspection-related activity, we com-
pared activity elicited by the introspection task withthat elicited during the slow categorization task during
the visual scan. Note that in terms of sensory stimuli
and motor output the two conditions were identical.
The only difference between the two conditions was in
the cognitive task, which changed from pure sensory
processing to an introspective task involving both sen-
sory processing and self-related interrogation. Thus,
we expect this contrast to highlight self-related areas
and areas involved in reflective processes. Figure 3
shows the results of this analysis. The figure depicts
multisubject, averaged data, while individual maps are
shown in Figure S1 (in the Supplemental Data available
with this article online) to provide an estimate of indi-
vidual variations. We indeed found consistent andFigure 3. Introspection-Related Activity:
Visual Scan
Activity maps for introspection versus slow
categorization tasks during the visual scan
shown in a folded view of both hemispheres
in their anatomical relations (center-top
panel), inflated (middle), and unfolded (bot-
tom) formats. Activation map from multisub-
ject (n = 9), random-effect GLM analysis.
The color scale indicates statistical signifi-
cance. Main foci, in yellow-orange, were in
prefrontal areas and lateralized to the left
hemisphere. CS, central sulcus; SFG, supe-
rior frontal gyrus; SFS, superior frontal sul-
cus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; pCgS,
paracingulate sulcus; STS, superior temporal
sulcus; IFS, inferior frontal sulcus; IFG, infe-
rior frontal gyrus; IPS, intraparietal sulcus;
IPC, inferior parietal cortex; LS, lateral sulcus;
pCun, precuneus; LOC, lateral occipital com-
plex; LH, left hemisphere; RH, right hemi-
sphere; A, anterior; P, posterior; M, medial;
L, lateral. Dotted line, estimated retinotopic
borders.
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Its Relation with Introspection-Related Activ-
ity: Visual Scan
Multisubject maps (n = 9). (A) Sensorimotor
activation revealed by the rapid versus slow
categorization conditions, presented on un-
folded maps. Yellow-orange regions indicate
significant activations for rapid versus slow
contrast (rapid > slow) as in left motor and bi-
lateral premotor regions (gray and white ar-
rows), while blue regions indicate the inverse
contrast (slow > rapid). Notice the left superior
frontal gyrus (red arrows) and posterior supe-
rior temporal sulcus. Note that the task (cate-
gorization) was identical, while the rate was
tripled during rapid compared to slow catego-
rization. (B) Superimposing the introspection
and the sensorimotor activation maps. Here,
yellow-orange regions show preferential acti-
vation for introspection versus slow categori-
zation (introspection > slow), while green re-
gions show preferential activation for rapid
versus slow categorization as in (A). Note the
striking segregation of the two maps with
minimal overlap (red areas). Notation same
as in Figure 3.significant activations (marked in orange-yellow colors)
in a network of areas that were mainly localized in the
PFC (for Talairach coordinates, see Table S1). Most
prominent activations were found in both medial and lat-
eral aspects of the PFC with clear lateralization to the left
hemisphere. Regions selectively activated by the intro-
spection task were found within the superior frontal gy-
rus (SFG; black arrow) extending medially to the anterior
cingulate region and caudally to the paracingulate re-
gion; the latter region showed similar activation also in
the right hemisphere (white arrow). Additional focus
was found in the posterior part of the middle frontal gy-
rus, just anterior to the precentral sulcus. Finally, bilat-
eral activations were found in the posterior part of the in-
ferior frontal gyrus extending to the anterior insula (gray
arrow). In addition to PFC activations, we found a few
patches in more posterior locations of the left hemi-
sphere located at the parietotemporal junction (also
termed the IPC). No cortical region showed the opposite
preference, i.e., significantly higher activations to slow
categorization versus introspection.
Visual Domain: Mapping Sensorimotor Processing
In order to reveal the activations related to sensorimotor
processing we examined a second contrast—rapid ver-
sus slow categorization conditions. Note that here, un-
like the previous contrast, the tasks were identical; how-
ever, the rate of sensory as well as motor processing
was tripled in the rapid condition. We thus expect all cor-
tical regions involved in sensorimotor processing as well
as all structures that are activated by task difficulty,
working memory, and attentional load to be highlighted.
Figure 4A depicts this pattern of activity on a multisub-
ject map; individual maps are shown in green in
Figure S1. Talairach coordinates of major foci are shownin Table S2. As can be seen, enhanced activation to the
faster stimulus rate (yellow-orange patches) was evident
in the entire chain of well-known visual areas along their
hierarchical processing, from V1 to LOC (dashed lines)
as well as parietal (black arrows) and premotor (white ar-
rows) cortices bilaterally, likely involved in attention and
planning motor functions, and finally motor areas (gray
arrow) lateralized to the left hemisphere (note that all
subjects responded with their right hand).
Here, we also found a set of regions that apparently
have manifested an opposite trend—i.e., higher activity
during the slow compared to the rapid categorization
(blue voxel). These included the posterior cingulate
and precuneus sulci and IPC in the left hemisphere. Par-
ticularly relevant to the present issue is the large nega-
tive focus in the SFG, which was strongly lateralized to
the left hemisphere (red arrow). These regions likely cor-
respond to the previously termed ‘‘default’’ brain net-
work (Raichle et al., 2001). It can already be evident
from the maps, that the introspection-related regions
and sensorimotor ones were largely segregated, with
the former mainly associated with PFC regions, while
the latter with occipitoparietal and temporal cortices.
To examine in more detail the relationship between
these two sets of regions, we superimposed the intro-
spection-related and sensory-related maps. This is
shown in Figure 4B for a multisubject map and in Fig-
ure S1 for individual data. In these maps, overlap regions
are depicted in red. Note the striking segregation of ac-
tivated regions revealed by these two contrasts—con-
sidering the inevitable neuroanatomical blur induced
by the multisubject maps, the segregation is quite strik-
ing. Small overlap regions appeared in transition zones
in the paracingulate region mainly on the right, and in
the left precentral sulcus. However, close inspection of
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333Figure 5. Time Course Analysis in Sensori-
motor and Introspection-Related Areas:
Visual Scan
Averaged time courses during introspection
(red), rapid (dark blue), and slow (light blue)
conditions. Data taken from three different
ROIs in the left hemisphere (see Experimental
Procedures for ROI definitions). (A) Averaged
time courses (n = 9) from the SFG. Note the
striking difference compared to sensorimotor
cortices. Here, only introspection showed
a positive (above baseline) response (p <
0.012, two-tailed, one-sample Student’s
t test). (B) The averaged time courses (n = 8)
sampled from motor cortex (M1) show posi-
tive activation in all conditions with marked in-
crease during rapid categorization. (C) Same
map as in Figure 4B. (D) Averaged time
courses (n = 8) from nonretinotopic object
areas (LOC); note the similar trend to M1. Error
bars, SEM.the individual maps (Figure S1) revealed that this overlap
was not consistent and was likely due to intersubject
variability of individual maps.
Time Course Analysis of Main Foci of Activation
To obtain a more quantitative description of the differen-
tial activation patterns, we sampled time courses from
representative foci of activity of the left hemisphere
(for details about region of interest [ROI] definition, see
Experimental Procedures): (1) primary motor cortex; (2)
nonretinotopic object areas including the LOC extend-
ing into the posterior fusiform and collateral regions;
(3) an introspection-related region in the SFG. The re-
sults of this analysis are shown in Figure 5. The respec-
tive activation time courses are shown for each ROI, and
the respective ROIs are indicated by the arrows leading
from the time course to the ROI location on the flat map.
Going from posterior to anterior, one can discern first
the object-related areas in the non-retinotopic visual
cortex (Figure 5D). In these regions, all conditions re-
sulted in an increase of activity compared to the rest
period. However, the rapid categorization task caused
a significantly higher activation compared to slow and
introspection conditions (p < 0.001, two-tailed, paired
Student’s t test for rapid versus introspection conditions
and for rapid versus slow conditions). The same behav-
ior was also noted in primary motor cortex (Figure 5B;
p < 0.001, two-tailed, paired Student’s t test for rapid
versus introspection conditions and for rapid versus
slow conditions). However, the most critical result of
this analysis is presented in cortex strongly associated
with introspection—i.e., left SFG (Figure 5A), inferior
frontal cortex, and also small islands in the IPC (Fig-
ure S3). While there are some differences between the
various regions, several common effects are apparent
in the time courses obtained from these regions: First,
introspection led to enhanced activation above baseline(in SFG, p < 0.012, two-tailed, one-sample Student’s
t test), while both sensory categorization tasks led to in-
hibitory responses below resting level (p < 0.006 and p <
0.001, two-tailed, one-sample Student’s t test, for slow
and rapid conditions, respectively). Second, increasing
the speed of sensorimotor processing did not lead to
enhanced activation—rather it either was similar or per-
haps even led to deeper inactivation.
The results clearly argue against coactivation of self-
related cortex during intense sensory processing. While
manifesting a pronounced inhibition during sensorimo-
tor tasks, the level of activity in the self-related cortex
showed a highly significant positive correlation with
the subjective rating of subjects’ self-awareness state
during the various conditions (Figure 2B).
How Reproducible Was the Introspection-Related
Activity?
While the perceptual categorization task is a well-estab-
lished paradigm that has been employed in a number of
fMRI experiments of object recognition (for a recent re-
view, see, e.g., Grill-Spector and Malach, 2004), the in-
trospection task is rather novel. Furthermore, compared
to object categorization, the introspection task certainly
appears to be more loosely defined and multidimen-
sional, and thus may have been subject to idiosyncratic
interpretations by different subjects participating in the
fMRI experiment. Thus, a potential problem in using
this task could be that different individuals will show
a highly differentiable activation patterns to this task,
making any generalized conclusions quite untenable.
To directly examine this problem, we compared how re-
producible the activation pattern was during the intro-
spection task compared to the rapid categorization
task. To that end, we superimposed all the individual ac-
tivations during these tasks on one map. The results of
this analysis are shown in Figure 6. The activation
Neuron
334Figure 6. Level of Intersubject Variability in
the Introspection- and Sensory-Related
Areas in Visual Scan
Borders of cortical areas from nine subjects
were superimposed on unfolded hemisphere
to assess their intersubject variability during
the visual scan. Colored lines represent
boundaries of activated regions for each sub-
ject. (Right panel) Enlargement of the poste-
rior visual cortex; colored contours indicate
boundaries of LOC in individual subjects.
Dotted line delimits estimated retinotopic
areas. (Left panel) enlargement of the superior
frontal gyrus (SFG). Colored contours indicate
boundaries of introspection-related activity.
Note that the intersubject variability was
roughly similar in these two sets of regions.
LH, left hemisphere; A, anterior; P, posterior.boundaries of different individuals are delineated by col-
ored contours. On the right are shown the LOCs of differ-
ent individuals, and on the left, the self-related areas in
the SFG. Note that the intersubject variability was not
dramatically different in these two sets of regions.
Are the Results Unimodal?
So far, we have discussed results that were strictly con-
fined to visual processing. To examine whether these re-
sults generalize to sensory processing of other modali-
ties, we repeated the same experimental design but
this time used the auditory modality. The basic experi-
mental design is shown in Figure 1. Note that it was
aimed to be similar to that of the visual modality exper-
iments (for details, see Experimental Procedures). Sub-
jects listened to short musical phrases that were gener-
ated by different musical instruments. Again there were
three conditions: in the slow categorization task, sub-
jects had to identify whether the sound was of a trumpet
versus any other instrument. Rate of presentation was 1
stimulus/3 s, as in the ‘‘visual scan.’’ In the introspection
task, stimuli and responses were identical, except that
subjects were required, after listening to the stimulus,
to indicate how the sound made them feel: positive/neg-
ative versus neutral. Finally, in the rapid categorization
task, the task was identical to the slow categorization
task, but rate of presentation was tripled (1 stimulus/s).
To directly compare the activation during introspec-
tion versus sensorimotor processing, we superimposed
the two maps. The results are shown in Figure 7 (for de-tailed maps, see Figure S2). To map the introspection-
related activity, we contrasted the introspection versus
slow categorization conditions. Similar to the visual do-
main, these had identical sensorimotor events but dif-
fered in the task involved. Figure 7 depicts the regions
preferentially activated during the introspection task
(yellow-orange voxels). As can be seen, the introspec-
tion versus slow categorization tasks showed a remark-
ably similar activation pattern to that found during the
visual introspection task. Patches of activation (marked
in orange-yellow colors) were found predominantly in
the left PFC, the SFG (black arrow), paracingulate sul-
cus, and inferior frontal gyrus. Although of less statisti-
cal significance, foci of activation were in similar ana-
tomical locations to those found in the visual scan. No
significant activations were found for this contrast in
the right hemisphere. Some patches showed preferen-
tial activation for slow categorization versus introspec-
tion, but these were of weak activation and located
mainly in posterior brain regions (shown in Figure S2A).
Comparing the rapid versus slow categorization condi-
tions (shown in Figure S2B) highlighted, as expected,
auditory cortical areas bilaterally and left primary motor
regions (green voxels). Also, premotor areas were acti-
vated bilaterally with slight lateralization for the right
PFC, where activations reached more rostral regions—
for example, in the middle frontal gyrus. Note that similar
to the visual domain there was a striking segrega-
tion of the two activation maps, indicating that in the
auditory modality too, the introspection task and theFigure 7. Introspection and Sensorimotor
Activations Maps: Auditory Domain
Multisubject (n = 8) unfolded maps showing
superposition of the introspection and the
sensorimotor activations (for detailed maps,
see Figure S2). As in the visual domain, note
the clear segregation of the two maps with
minimal overlap (red areas) mainly in the left
paracingulate sulcus. Notations same as in
Figure 3.
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(A) Multisubject activation map (n = 9) for
self versus semantic tasks shown in an un-
folded view of both hemispheres. Random-
effect GLM analysis. The color scale indicates
corrected statistical significance. Main foci, in
yellow-orange, are present in the left SFG and
medial PFC bilaterally. Note foci of activation
in posterior cingulate/precuneus and tempor-
oparietal regions.
(B) Unfolded view of the left hemisphere. In
green, activation map from introspection ver-
sus rapid categorization contrast during the
visual introspection experiment. In yellow-
orange, self versus semantic task, as shown
in (A). Red area corresponds to regions that
showed significant activation in both experi-
ments. Note the SFG in the PFC and, in the
more posterior region, three foci of activity
reminiscent of the ‘‘default network.’’ Nota-
tions same as in Figure 3.
(C) Averaged time course (n = 9) sampled from
the SFG during the self-judgment control ex-
periment. Colors denote self (red), semantic
(green), and picture (blue) judgment tasks.
ROI defined within the SFG using the contrast:
introspection versus rapid categorization
during the visual introspection experiment.
Activationof theself-judgmentshowedaclear
positive response compared to the semantic
judgment task, which resulted in inhibitory re-
sponse. The emotional picture judgment task,
although higher than the semantic task, was
clearly below the self-judgment. Error bars,
SEM.sensorimotor processing tasks activated mainly non-
overlapping territories. Finally, similar to the visual do-
main, increasing the processing rate did not lead to en-
hanced activity but showed similar and perhaps even
more negative response.
Thus, with regard to the issue of coactivation of self-
related regions during intense sensorimotor processing,
the results from both the auditory and visual modalities
converge in showing a clear segregation between these
two sets of areas. Furthermore, increasing the sensori-
motor demands failed to simulate the introspection
effects.
Possible Involvement of Emotional Processing
When considering the various aspects involved in the in-
trospection task, it is clear that this is a highly complex
cognitive state. While the self-reflective aspect was the
most outstanding one, there is no doubt that other men-
tal dimensions were engaged as well. A particularly
prominent aspect that has been tightly associated with
introspection and self-related processes is emotional
engagement. Thus, it could be argued that the higher ac-
tivation we found during introspection may not be due to
self-related processes, but rather to enhanced attention
or processing of emotional stimuli. To examine this pos-
sibility, we conducted a control experiment in which, on
the one hand, we attempted to define self-related pro-
cesses using more neutral stimuli, while on the other
hand we used highly emotional stimuli while attempting
to minimize the self-related aspects. To that end, we
modified a previously reported judgment task used to
map self-related areas (Kelley et al., 2002). Subjectswere presented with a set of words and were asked in
one condition (self) to judge whether the words applied
to themselves and in the other condition (semantic) to
judge whether the word was a noun or a verb. We
have made a specific attempt to use words which
were as emotionally neutral as possible. In the third con-
dition, subjects were presented with highly emotional
pictures and were asked to judge whether the pictures
were attractive or not (see Experimental Procedures
for details).
The results of this control experiment are shown in
Figure 8. Figure 8A shows a multisubject (n = 9) map
showing the contrast self versus semantic judgment.
Similar to the introspection test, this contrast high-
lighted clear activation foci strongly lateralized to the
left PFC and localized islands of activity in posterior cor-
tex lateralized around the left IPC and bilateral in the pre-
cuneus region. To examine whether these activations
corresponded to the regions activated during the intro-
spection task, we superimposed the introspection
map and the self-judgment control. The result of this su-
perposition is shown in Figure 8B. Note that a clear-cut
overlap can be evident between the two experiments,
particularly in the left SFG as well as in the more poste-
rior IPC. Using the introspection experiment to define an
external SFG ROI (using the contrast introspection ver-
sus rapid categorization), we sampled the activity for
the three conditions of self-judgment control experi-
ment. The results are presented in Figure 8C and show
a highly significant (p < 0.002, two-tailed, paired Stu-
dent’s t test) activation to the self versus semantic judg-
ment task, which resulted in clear inhibitory response,
Neuron
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task, although higher than the semantic task, was again
clearly below the self-judgment task. These results sup-
port the conclusion that the SFG is mediating aspects of
self-related, rather than purely emotional, processing.
Discussion
The main outcome of the present study was the finding
of a complete segregation between self-related cortical
regions, revealed through introspection-related activity,
and sensorimotor cortex, revealed through rapid cate-
gorization-related activity. Furthermore, rather than
showing coactivation, self-related cortex was inhibited
during the rapid categorization task (see Figure 5A)
below the rest condition, indicating that sensory pro-
cessing and self-related representations are actually
mutually antagonistic processes. Thus, activity in self-
related regions showed a consistent inhibition during
sensorimotor processing. Before discussing the possi-
ble implications of this finding, we discuss the possible
reservations.
Is the Introspective Task Appropriate?
The first obvious reservation is that our method for high-
lighting self-related cortical regions may have not been
appropriate. Indeed, the entire concept of self and its
possible cortical representations is still quite a contro-
versial issue (Keenan et al., 2001; Morin, 2002). This is
not surprising, since the nature and attributes of self-
related systems are highly complex and still rather ill-
defined. Thus, one could argue that the introspection
versus slow categorization contrast used here activated
mainly regions concerned with emotional processing or
with more deliberate contemplative type of thinking
rather than true self-related activity.
On the other hand, it could be argued that different
self-engaging cognitive tasks could have been more ef-
fective in revealing additional self-related representa-
tions that were not highlighted in the present experiment
and may have different relationships or even coacti-
vated during sensorimotor tasks.
Several lines of evidence suggest that these valid con-
cerns do not apply in the present study. First, comparing
the present results to other studies that attempted to
map self-related activations revealed a substantial level
of consistency across all these studies. Despite the use
of a rather wide range of self-related tasks, all these
studies converge onto a common network of areas. In
particular, all these results share consistently increased
activity in medial PFC (BA32) extending laterally to the
superior frontal sulcus (BA 8-9-10) (Schmitz et al.,
2004; Johnson et al., 2002; Lane et al., 1997; Frith et al.,
1999; Gusnard et al., 2001). Furthermore, our own re-
sults, which employed two different self-related tasks—
introspection and self-judgments—showed a significant
overlap between these tasks in the activity level at the
SFG as well as additional PFC areas, which were also re-
lated to the subjective rating of self-awareness pro-
duced by subjects (see Figure 2B). Interestingly, these
areas show substantial overlap with the ‘‘default
mode’’ network of areas (Raichle et al., 2001), which
are intriguingly related to high-level mental functionssuch as ‘‘theory of mind’’ and social cognition (Vogeley
and Fink, 2003; Iacoboni et al., 2004).
Could it be that other self-related tasks may engage
additional cortical areas not highlighted by the present
study? A number of studies, examining self-related acti-
vations, most prominently recognition of self-images,
reported a right hemisphere bias in the activation pat-
terns (Keenan et al., 2000; Schmitz et al., 2004) (but
see Turk et al., 2002). Although these reported activa-
tions appear to be at homologous locations to the acti-
vations reported here, the present results point to left
rather than right hemisphere bias. However, close in-
spection of our activation maps during rapid categoriza-
tion does not indicate a possibility of overlap between
these activations and right prefrontal areas, which
were not activated during the rapid sensory categoriza-
tion task (see Figure 4A). Furthermore, it should be em-
phasized that, within the large array of possible self-
related cognitive tasks, the ones chosen here, namely
sensory emotional introspection and self-judgment,
are likely to cover a large spectrum of self-related pro-
cesses. Indeed, as noted already by James (1890), intro-
spection is the central route by which we reflect upon
and report to the outside world about the existence,
quality, and fine characteristics of our sensory experi-
ences. Note also that, in the introspection task, both
the sensory and motor aspects were identical to the
slow categorization task, so all the differential activa-
tions we found should have been strictly related to the
introspective aspect of the task.
With regards to the possibility that the introspection
task was ill defined, and subject to idiosyncratic inter-
pretations by different subjects, our results show that,
to the contrary, the activation during this task was no
less reproducible across individuals than the more con-
ventional object categorization task (see Figure 6).
It is important to note that the self-related activations
reported here were also compatible with the large body
of evidence obtained from neuropsychological literature
(Kolb, 1990; Luria, 1973), in particular the medial wall of
the PFC (Damasio, 1994; Stuss and Anderson, 2004).
Thus, our results are substantially compatible with the
literature of self-related brain activation.
Finally, although subjective awareness is intimately
linked to emotional processing (Damasio, 1999; Gus-
nard et al., 2001; Phan et al., 2004), our control experi-
ment in which we chose a self-judgment task involving
emotionally neutral words strongly argues against an
emotional confound in our results. The fact that the
same cortical regions, particularly the left SFG, were ac-
tivated by both emotional introspection and self-judg-
ment and not by the emotional judgment task (Figure 8C)
strongly supports a self-related rather than emotional
attention role for this region.
Variations in Baseline Activity
Unlike sensory and motor cortex, prefrontal, self-related
regions showed substantial fluctuations in baseline,
‘‘task-negative’’ activity (e.g., Figure 5). The source of
this effect is unclear at present. One possibility is that
it reflects ‘‘rebound’’ effects stemming from the preced-
ing epoch. If such baseline effects persisted into the
task period, they may have affected the measured acti-
vation level. This factor may be particularly relevant in
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gions was accentuated by the task demand. However, it
should be noted that a relationship between task diffi-
culty and inhibition level has been reported in a number
of previous studies of cortical inactivation (e.g.,
McKiernan et al., 2003).
Relevant Data from Previous Experiments
Supporting data to our present results can be found also
in a number of studies that report consistent inactiva-
tions in prefrontal cortical areas. Thus, in experiments
that were aimed to find self-related activations, Kelley
et al. (2002) and Gusnard et al. (2001) also found clear
inactivation during sensory categorization functions.
Here, we extend these results by showing (1) that the in-
trospection-related activation could not have been ex-
plained simply by attentional load that may have been
associated with introspection, since increasing the rate
of sensorimotor processing failed to mimic the en-
hanced activation found during introspection; (2) that
the inhibitory effects occur during both visual and audi-
tory categorizations; (3) that the self-related results are
not limited to emotional introspection but overlap with
a completely different self-related task—self-judgment
(see Figure 8B).
The inhibition of cortical area by sensory stimulation is
also reminiscent to that found in the ‘‘default mode’’
brain network of areas (Raichle et al., 2001), which un-
dergo inactivation during a wide variety of goal-directed
cognitive tasks and involve also regions in the precu-
neus and inferior parietal cortex. What is the significance
of these robust inactivations? It is tempting to speculate
that such inhibitory effects reflect a global resource allo-
cation network, analogous to the attentional ‘‘spotlight’’
proposed for sensory systems (Crick, 1984), which is re-
sponsible for ‘‘shutting off’’ cortical representations not
needed for the performance of certain tasks. According
to this proposal, the cognitive demands during the rapid
object categorization tasks necessitate ‘‘turning off’’ the
self-related cortical representations. This inactivation is
useful to prevent distracting activity that is not essential
to the successful accomplishment of the perceptual
tasks.
Broad Implications of the Self-Related Inactivations
As noted in the introduction, the fact that self-related
cortical representations become inactive during intense
sensory perception bears profound implications to
models of subjective awareness. Essentially, these re-
sults argue that PFC self-representations are not a nec-
essary element in the emergence of sensory perception.
Indeed, it appears that self-related activity is actually
shut off during highly demanding sensory tasks.
Thus, the present results clearly argue against the in-
clusion of self-related representations in the list of in-
gredients necessary for the emergence of subjective
awareness. This interpretation is compatible with a large
body of neuropsychological data that clearly show that
even extensive PFC lesions do not substantially disrupt
the phenomenology of sensory perception (Luria, 1973;
Stuss and Benson, 1986). We propose that the role of
self-related cortex is not in enabling perceptual aware-
ness, but rather in allowing the individual to reflect
upon sensory experiences, to judge their possible sig-nificance to the self, and, not less importantly for con-
sciousness research, to allow the individual to report
about the occurrence of his sensory experience to the
outside world.
To conclude, the picture that emerges from the pres-
ent results is that, during intense perceptual engage-
ment, all neuronal resources are focused on sensory
cortex, and the distracting self-related cortex is inactive.
Thus, the term ‘‘losing yourself’’ receives here a clear
neuronal correlate. This theme has a tantalizing echoing
in Eastern philosophies such as Zen teachings, which
emphasize the need to enter into a ‘‘mindless,’’ selfless
mental state to achieve a true sense of reality (Suzuki,
1964).
Experimental Procedures
Subjects
Nine healthy subjects (five women, ages 22–32, right-handed;
Raczkowski et al., 1974) participated in the visual scan and the self-
judgment control experiment. Among them, eight participated in the
auditory scan. Subjects had normal hearing and normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and provided written informed consent. The Tel-
Aviv Sourasky Medical Center approved the experimental protocol.
Tasks
Subjects were required to fixate throughout the scan and to perform
one of two tasks: categorization and introspection. In the categori-
zation task, subjects were asked to categorize pictures into ani-
mal/no-animal categories in the visual scan and into trumpet/
no-trumpet categories in the auditory scan (see below). During the
introspective task, subjects viewed the images (heard musical clips
in auditory scan) and then self-introspected about the emotional re-
sponse elicited in them by these stimuli and categorized their reac-
tion to the stimuli as high (positive or negative) versus neutral emo-
tional response. Subjects indicated with a single button press their
responses after each stimuli presentation with the right hand, using
the index finger for animal/trumpet or high-arousal introspects, and
the middle finger for no-animal/no-trumpet or neutral introspects.
Reaction time and percent correct, where relevant, were examined.
Stimuli
Visual scan: stimuli consisted of colored picture of animals, houses,
and objects of various levels of emotional arousal (Phan et al., 2004),
including a fixation spot. All pictures (10º 3 10º visual angle) were
presented for 200 ms. Auditory scan: stimuli were short (1 s) musical
clips sampled from different musical instruments databank (trum-
pet, piano, organ). Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Sys-
tems) was used to deliver the stimuli and record subjects responses;
visual stimuli were projected via an LCD projector (Epson MP 7200)
onto a tangent screen positioned in front of the subject’s forehead
and viewed through a tilted mirror; auditory stimuli were delivered
via headphones.
Experimental Paradigm
The experiment comprised two 528 s long scans: visual and audi-
tory. Stimuli were shown in 12 s blocks and alternated with 6 s
gray field-blanks (see Figure 1). Eight blocks for each of the three
conditions were pseudorandomly ordered, for a total of 24 blocks
(Figure 1A). Each scan, visual and auditory, consisted of three con-
ditions: introspection and rapid and slow categorization. Slow cate-
gorization and introspection conditions included four stimuli in each
block (one picture every 3 s), while the rapid categorization condition
contained 12 stimuli displayed within each epoch. Thus, the presen-
tation rate was tripled in the rapid categorization so that subjects
were both stimulated and had to respond at three times the speed
of the slow categorization and introspection conditions. During
epochs, stimuli were placed within a background of a grass field
that was presented throughout the 12 s of each epoch. During
blanks, a uniform gray screen with fixation was presented. Before
each block, a letter appeared for 1 s (followed by a grass field screen
for 2 s) indicating to the subjects what task to do: ‘‘I’’ for
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338introspection and ‘‘C’’ for categorization. With the exception of stim-
ulus lengths and ISI, visual and auditory scans were similar in all
other aspects.
Self-Judgment Control Experiment
The aim of this blocked design scan was to control for emotional at-
tention as a confound of self-representation. The temporal se-
quence was similar to the visual and auditory introspection scans.
Each condition comprised eight 12 s long epochs followed by a 6 s
long fixation condition for a total of 24 pseudorandomly interleaved
blocks (total time 528 s). A 1 s instruction shown 3 s prior to each
block indicated to the subjects what task to perform. Subjects re-
sponded after each stimulus in the same way as in the introspection
experiments. The scan consisted of three conditions: self-judgment
(‘‘self’’), semantic judgment (‘‘semantic’’), and emotional picture
judgment (‘‘picture’’). Subjects were presented with a set of words
and were asked in the ‘‘self’’ condition to judge whether the words
applied to themselves and in the ‘‘semantic’’ condition to judge
whether the words were a noun or a verb. The words were specifi-
cally chosen to be as emotionally neutral as possible. One-third of
the words were verbs (e.g., swim, study, run), and two-thirds were
nouns (e.g., bus, radio, coffee). Four words were presented in
each block; each word was shown for 400 ms. During the emotional
pictures condition, subjects were presented photographs of high
emotional valence and were asked to judge each picture as either
of positive (attractive) or negative (repulsive) valence. Pictures
were selected from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS; University of Florida) based on normative ratings for valence
and arousal; negative (50%) and positive (50%) pictures had valence
of <4 and >6, respectively, and arousal between 4 and 6 (for both, on
a scale of 1–9; Lang et al., 2005). Positive and negative pictures were
equally distributed across the condition. Pictures were similar in
their physical properties to those presented in experiment 1 (visual
introspection). Each block in the ‘‘pictures’’ condition consisted of
nine pictures displayed for 400 ms.
MRI Acquisition
Subjects were scanned on a 1.5 Signa Horizon LX 8.25 GE scanner
equipped with a standard birdcage head coil. Blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) contrast was obtained with gradient echo
echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR, 3000; TE, 55; flip angle,
90º; field of view, 24 3 24 cm2; matrix size, 80 3 80). The scanned
volume included 24 to 27 nearly axial slices of 4 mm thickness and
1 mm gap, so to cover the entire cortical surface of the brain. T1-
weighted high-resolution (1.1 3 1.1 mm) anatomical images and
a whole brain spoiled gradient (SPGR) sequences were acquired
for each subject to allow accurate cortical segmentation and recon-
struction, and volume-based statistical analysis. The cortical sur-
face reconstructed from the three-dimensional SPGR scan was
then unfolded and flattened. The obtained activation maps were
superimposed on the unfolded cortex.
Data Analysis
fMRI data were analyzed with the ‘‘BrainVoyager’’ software package
(Brain Innovation, Masstricht, Netherlands) and with complementary
in-house software. The cortical surface in a Talairach coordinate
system (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) was reconstructed for each
subject from the 3D-spoiled gradient echo scan. The obtained acti-
vation maps were superimposed on the unfolded cortex. Prepro-
cessing of functional scans included 3D motion correction and filter-
ing out of low frequencies up to five cycles per experiment (slow
drift). Statistical mapping was based on the General Linear Model
(Friston, 1995). Our analysis consisted of a multiple regression
with a regressor for each condition in the experiment, using a boxcar
shape and assuming a hemodynamic lag of 3–6 s. The analysis was
performed independently for the time course of each individual
voxel. After computing the coefficients for all regressors, we per-
formed a Student’s t test between coefficients of different condi-
tions (e.g., introspection versus slow categorization). To obtain the
multisubject maps, time series of images of brain volumes for
each subject were converted into Talairach space and z normalized.
The multisubject maps were obtained using a random-effect proce-
dure (Friston et al., 1999). The multisubject functional maps were
projected on an inflated or unfolded Talairach normalized brain. Sig-nificance levels were calculated, taking into account the minimum
cluster size and the probability threshold of a false detection of
any given cluster. This was accomplished by a Monte Carlo simula-
tion (AlphaSim by B. Douglas Ward), using the combination of indi-
vidual voxel probability thresholding and minimum cluster size of 6
voxels; the probability of a false positive detection per image was
determined from the frequency count of cluster sizes within the en-
tire cortical surface (not including white matter and subnuclei). Color
scales indicate the statistical level ranging from p < 0.01 (darker
colors) up to at least p < 0.0001 (brighter colors).
Definitions of ROIs
ROIs were defined on the cortical surface as significant clusters of at
least 50 mm2 (p < 0.05, corrected), and the Talairach coordinates
were determined for the center of each ROI. Object-related areas
(LOC) were defined using the well-established contrast (object im-
ages > texture patterns) in each subject using a separate ‘‘localizer’’
scan (Levy et al., 2001; Hasson et al., 2003; Kourtzi and Kanwisher,
2001). Similarly, retinotopic areas were defined using our standard
retinotopic mapping approach in a separate experiment described
previously (Levy et al., 2001; Hasson et al., 2003). ‘‘External localizer’’
approach was used to define motor cortex (M1) and was defined ac-
cording to the rapid > slow categorization contrast in the auditory
scan within the vicinity of the left central sulcus. Finally, left SFG
and additional areas were defined according to the introspection >
categorization (slow and rapid) contrast in the visual scan. Note
that those tests provide equal bias for the rapid and slow conditions
analysis during the visual scan.
Evaluation of Subjective Self-Awareness
This behavioral experiment was conducted outside of the MRI scan-
ner to allow the evaluation to be conducted immediately following
the sensorimotor task. Stimuli and responses were identical to the
MRI experiment. However, immediately upon completion of the ex-
periment, subjects were asked to rate their subjective self-aware-
ness for each condition on a 1 to 3 scale. In this scale 1 = no or neg-
ligible sense of self-awareness, 2 = mild level of self-awareness, and
3 = strong sense of self-awareness (see Figure 2).
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data include three supplemental figures and two
supplemental tables and can be found with this article online at
http://www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/50/2/329/DC1/.
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